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Abstract
How can several individualsprobability functions on a given -algebra
of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic ap-
proaches to this problem usually require event-wise independence: the col-
lective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals
probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be ba-
sic and others derivative, so that it makes sense rst to aggregate the
probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities
for the latter. We formalize this idea by introducing a premise-basedap-
proach to probabilistic opinion pooling, and show that, under a variety of
assumptions, it leads to linear or neutral opinion pooling on the premises.
Keywords: Probabilistic opinion pooling, judgment aggregation, subjec-
tive probability, premise-based aggregation
1 Introduction
Suppose each individual member of some group (expert panel, court, jury etc.)
assigns probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assign-
ments be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classically, this
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problem has been modelled as the aggregation of probability functions, which
are dened on some -algebra of events, a set of events that is closed under
negation and countable disjunction (and thereby also under countable conjunc-
tion). Each individual submits a probability function on the given -algebra, and
these probability functions are then aggregated into a single collective probability
function. One of the best-known solutions to this aggregation problem is linear
pooling, where the collective probability function is a linear average of the individ-
ual probability functions. Linear pooling has several salient properties. First, if
all individuals unanimously assign probability 1 (or probability 0) to some event,
this probability assignment is preserved collectively (consensus preservation).
Second, the collective probability for each event depends only on individual prob-
abilities for that event (event-wise independence). Third, all events are treated
equally: the pattern of dependence between individual and collective probability
assignments is the same for all events (neutrality).
In many practical applications, however, not all events are equal. In particu-
lar, the events in a -algebra may fall into two categories (whose boundaries may
be drawn in di¤erent ways). On the one hand, there are events that correspond
to intuitively basic propositions, such as it will rain, it will be humid, or at-
mospheric CO2 causes global warming. On the other hand, there are events that
are intuitively non-basic. These can be viewed as combinations of basic events,
for instance via disjunction (union) of basic events, conjunction (intersection), or
negation (complementation). It is not obvious that when we aggregate probabili-
ties, basic and non-basic events should be treated alike.
For a start, we may conceptualize basic and non-basic events di¤erently, in
analogy to the distinction between atomic and composite propositions in logic
(the latter being logical combinations of the former). Second, the way we assign
probabilities to non-basic events is likely to di¤er from the way we assign probabil-
ities to basic events. When we assign a probability to a conjunction or disjunction,
this typically presupposes the assignment of probabilities to the underlying con-
juncts or disjuncts. For example, the obvious way to assign a probability to the
event rain or heatis to ask what the probability of rain is, what the probabil-
ity of heat is, and whether the two are correlated.1 If this is right, the natural
method of making probabilistic judgments is to consider basic events rst and to
consider non-basic events next. Basic events serve as premises: we rst assign
probabilities to them, and then let these probability assignments constrain our
probability assignments for other, non-basic events.
In this paper, we propose an approach to probability aggregation that cap-
tures this idea: the premise-based approach. Under this approach, the group rst
assigns collective probabilities to all basic events (the premises) by aggregating
the individidualsprobabilities for them; and then it assigns probabilities to all
other events, constrained by the probabilities of the basic events. If the basic
1The correlation might be due to causal e¤ects between, or common causes of, rain and heat.
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events are rainand heat, then, in a rst step, the collective probabilities for
these two events are determined by aggregating the individual probabilities for
them. In a second step, the collective probabilities for all other events are as-
signed. For example, the collective probability of rain and heatmight be dened
as a suitable function of the collective probability of rain, the collective prob-
ability of heat, and an estimated rain/heat-correlation coe¢ cient, which could
be the result of aggregating the rain/heat-correlation coe¢ cients encoded in the
individual probability functions.
This proposal can be expressed more precisely by a single axiom, which does
not require the (inessential) sequential implementation just sketched, but focuses
on a core informational restriction: the collective probability of any premise(ba-
sic event) should depend solely on the individual probabilities for this premise,
not on individual probabilities for other events. We call this axiom independence
on premises. Our axiomatic analysis of premise-based aggregation is inspired by
binary judgment-aggregation theory, where the premise-based approach has also
been characterized by a restricted independence axiom, for instance by Dietrich
(2006), Mongin (2008), and Dietrich and Mongin (2010). For less formal dis-
cussions of premise-based aggregation, see Kornhauser and Sager (1986), Pettit
(2001), List and Pettit (2002), and List (2006).
The way in which we have just motivated the premise-based approach and the
corresponding axiom is bound to prompt some questions. In particular, although
the distinction between basic and non-basic events is arguably not ad hoc,
there is no purely formal criterion for drawing that distinction.2 However, there is
another, less controversial motivation for the premise-based approach. Our cen-
tral axiom independence on premises privileges particular events, called the
premises. We have so far interpreted these in a very specic way, taking them
2One could construct basic events from non-basic events, using the operations of negation and
disjunction. Formally, while the basic events typically form a generating system of the -algebra,
there exist many alternative generating systems, and usually none of them is canonical in a
technical sense. The task of determining the basicevents therefore involves some interpretation
and may be context-dependent and open to disagreement. One might, however, employ a
syntactic criterion which counts an event as basic if, in a suitable language (perhaps one
deemed natural), it can be expressed by an atomic sentence (one that is not a combination
of other sentences using Boolean connectives). An event expressible by the sentence it will
rain or it will snow would then count as non-basic. This syntactic criterion relies on our
choice of language, which, though not a purely technical matter, is arguably not ad hoc. An
n-place connective (e.g., the two-place connective or) is called Boolean or truth-functional if
the truth-value of every sentence constructed by applying this connective to n other sentences is
determined by the truth values of the latter sentences. For instance, oris Boolean since p or q
is true if and only if pis true or qis true. Many languages, especially ones that mimic natural
language, contain non-Boolean connectives, for instance non-material conditionals for which the
truth-value of if p then qis not always determined by the truth-values of p and q. When the
sentence if p then qis not truth-functionally decomposable, an event represented by it would
count as basicunder the present syntactic criterion. The sentence CO2 emissions cause global
warmingcan be viewed as the non-material (specically, causal) conditional if p then q, hence
would describe a basic event. See Priest (2001) for an introduction to non-classical logic.
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to correspond to basic events and to constitute the premises in an individuals
probability-assignment process. But we can give up this interpretation and dene
a premisesimply as an event for which it is desirable that the collective prob-
ability depend solely on the event-specic individual probabilities. If premises
are dened like this, then our axiom  independence on premises  is justied
by denition (though of course we can no longer o¤er any guidance as to which
events should count as premises).3
We show that premise-based opinion pooling imposes signicant restrictions
on how the collective probabilities of the premises can be determined. At the
same time, these restrictions are not undesirable; they do not lead to undemo-
craticor degenerateforms of opinion pooling. Specically, given certain logi-
cal connections between the premises, independence on premises, together with
a unanimity-preservation requirement, implies that the collective probability for
each premise is a (possibly weighted) linear average of the individual probabilities
for that premise, where the vector of weights across di¤erent individuals is the
same for each premise. We present several variants of this result, which di¤er in
the nature of the unanimity-preservation requirement and in the kinds of connec-
tions that are assumed to hold between premises. In some variants, we do not
obtain the linearityconclusion, but only a weaker neutralityconclusion: the
collective probability for each premise must be a (possibly non-linear) function of
the individual probabilities for that premise, where this function is the same for
each premise. These results are structurally similar to those in our companion
paper (Dietrich and List 2014), though interpretationally di¤erent. Furthermore,
our results stand in contrast with existing results on the premise-based approach
in binary judgment aggregation. When judgments are binary, independence on
premises leads to dictatorial aggregation under analogous conditions (see espe-
cially Dietrich and Mongin 2010).
Our results apply regardless of which events are deemed to serve as premises.
In the extreme case in which all events count as premises, the requirement of
independence on premises reduces to the familiar event-wise independence axiom
(sometimes called the strong setwise function property), and our results reduce
to a classic characterization of linear pooling (see Aczél and Wagner 1980 and
McConway 1981; see also Wagner 1982 and 1985; Aczél, Ng and Wagner 1984;
Genest 1984a, Mongin 1995; and Chambers 2007).4
3The terminology premiseis still justied, though not in the sense of premise of individual
probability assignment(since we no longer assume that premises are basic in the individuals
formation of probabilistic beliefs), but in the sense of premise of collective probability assign-
ment(because the collective probabilities for these events are determined independently of the
probabilities of other events and then constrain other collective probabilities).
4Historically, linear pooling goes back at least to Stone (1961). Linear pooling is by no means
the only plausible way to aggregate subjective probabilities. Other approaches include geometric
and, more generally, externally Bayesian pooling (e.g., McConway 1978, Genest 1984b and
Genest, McConway, and Schervish 1986), multiplicative pooling (Dietrich 2010), supra-Bayesian
pooling (e.g., Morris 1974), and pooling of ordinal probabilities (Weymark 1997). For literature
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2 The framework
We consider a group of n  2 individuals, labelled i = 1; :::; n, who have to assign
collective probabilities to some events.
The agenda: a -algebra of events. We consider a non-empty set 
 of pos-
sible worlds (or states). An event is a subset A of 
; its complement (negation)
is denoted Ac := 
nA. The set of events to which probabilities are assigned is
called the agenda. We assume that it is a -algebra,   2
, i.e., a set of events
that is closed under complementation and countable union (and by implication
also countable intersection). The simplest non-trivial example of a -algebra is of
the form  = fA;Ac;
;?g, where ? ( A ( 
. Another example is the set 2

of all events; this is a commonly studied -algebra when 
 is nite or countably
innite. A third example is the -algebra of Borel-measurable sets when 
 = R.
An example. Let us give an example similar to the lead example in our com-
panion paper (Dietrich and List 2014), except that we now take the agenda to be a
-algebra. Let the set 
 of possible worlds be the set of vectors f0; 1g3nf(1; 1; 0)g
with the following interpretation. The rst component of each vector indicates
whether atmospheric CO2 is above some threshold (1 = yesand 0 = no), the
second component indicates whether there is a mechanism to the e¤ect that if
atmospheric CO2 is above that threshold, then Arctic summers are ice-free, and
the third component indicates whether Arctic summers are ice-free. The triple
(1; 1; 0) is excluded from 
 because it would represent an inconsistent combination
of characteristics. Now the agenda is  = 2
.
The opinions: probability functions. Opinions are represented by proba-
bility functions on . Formally, a probability function on  is a function P :
 ! [0; 1] such that P (
) = 1 and P is -additive (i.e., P (A1 [ A2 [ :::) =
P (A1) +P (A2) + ::: for every sequence of pairwise disjoint events A1; A2; ::: 2 ).
We write P to denote the set of all probability functions on .
Opinion pooling. Given the agenda , a combination of probability functions
across the individuals, (P1; :::; Pn), is called a prole (of probability functions).
An (opinion) pooling function is a function F : Pn ! P, which assigns to each
prole (P1; :::; Pn) a collective probability function P = F (P1; :::; Pn), also denoted
PP1;:::;Pn. An example of PP1;:::;Pn is the arithmetic average
1
n
P1 + :::+
1
n
Pn.
Some logical terminology. We conclude this section with some further termi-
nology. Events distinct from ? and 
 are called contingent. A set S of events is
reviews, see Genest and Zidek (1986) and Clemen and Winkler (1999).
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consistent if its intersection \A2SA is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise; S
entails an event B if the intersection of S is included in B (i.e., \A2SA  B).
3 Axiomatic requirements on premise-based
opinion pooling
We now introduce the axioms that we require a premise-based opinion pooling
function to satisfy.
3.1 Independence on premises
Before we introduce our new axiom of independence on premises, let us recall the
familiar requirement of (event-wise) independence. It requires that the collective
probability for any event depend only on the individual probabilities for that
event, independently of the probabilities of other events.
Independence. For each event A 2 , there exists a functionDA : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1]
(the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)):
This requirement can be criticized  in the classical framework where the
agenda is a -algebra for being normatively unattractive. Typically only some
of the events in the -algebra  correspond to intuitively basic propositions such
as the economy will growor atmospheric CO2 causes global warming. Other
events in  are combinations of basic events, such as the economy will grow or at-
mospheric CO2 causes global warming. The non-basic events can get enormously
complicated: they can be conjunctions of (nitely or countably innitely many)
basic events, or disjunctions, or disjunctions of conjunctions, and so on. It seems
natural to privilege the basic events over the other, more articialevents by re-
placing the independence requirement with a restricted independence requirement
that quanties only over basic events. Indeed, it seems implausible to apply inde-
pendence to composite events such as the economy will grow or atmospheric CO2
causes global warming, since this would prevent us from using the probabilities
of each of the constituent events in determining the overall probability.
By restricting the independence requirement to basic events, we treat these
as premises in the collective probability-assignment process, rst aggregating in-
dividual probabilities for basic events and then letting the resulting collective
probabilities constrain the collective probabilities of all other events. (The proba-
bilities of the premises constrain those other probabilities because the probability
assignments in their entirety must be probabilistically coherent.)
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Formally, consider a sub-agenda of , denoted X, which we interpret as con-
taining the basic events, called the premises. By a sub-agenda we mean a subset
of  which is non-empty and closed under complementation (i.e., it forms an
agendain the generalized sense discussed in our companion paper, Dietrich and
List 2014). We introduce the following axiom:
Independence on X (on premises). For each A 2 X, there exists a function
DA : [0; 1]
n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2
P,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)):
In the climate-change example of Section 2, the sub-agenda of premises might
be dened asX = fA1; Ac1; A2; Ac2; A3; Ac3g, where A1 is the event that atmospheric
CO2 is above the critical threshold, A2 is the event that there is a mechanisms by
which CO2 concentrations above the threshold cause ice-free Arctic summers, and
A3 is the event of ice-free Arctic summers. Conjunctions such as A1 \A2 are not
included in the set X of premises here. As a result, independence on X allows the
collective probability for any such conjunction to depend not only on the experts
probabilities for that conjunction, but also, for instance, on their probabilities for
the underlying conjuncts (together with auxiliary assumptions about correlations
between them).5
We have explained why event-wise independence should not be required for
non-basic events. But why should we require it for basic events (premises)? We
o¤er three reasons:
 First, if we accept the idea that an individuals probabilistic belief about
a given premise is not inuenced by, but might inuence, his or her beliefs
about other events, then we may regard those other beliefs as either by-
products of, or unrelated to, the individuals belief about the premise in
question. It then seems reasonable to treat those other beliefs as irrelevant
to the question of what collective probability to assign to that premise.
(More precisely, any beliefs about other events provide no relevant additional
information once the individuals belief about the premise is given.)
 Second, the premise-based approach can be motivated by appealing to the
idea of a rational collective agent that forms its probabilistic beliefs by
reasoning from premises to conclusions. This kind of collective reasoning
can be implemented by rst aggregating the probabilities for the premises
and then letting these constrain the probabilities assigned to other events.
In the case of binary judgment aggregation, Pettit (2001) has described this
process as the collectivization of reason.
5These assumptions might be given exogenously; or they might be determined endogenously
based on the expertsprobability functions (e.g., based on how dependent or independent the
conjuncts are according to these probability functions).
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 Third, as mentioned in the introduction, one might simply dene the
premises as the events for which it is desirable that the collective probabili-
ties depend solely on the event-specic individual probabilities. This would
render the requirement of independence on premises justied by denition.
3.2 Consensus preservation on premises
Informally, our second axiomatic requirement says that whenever there is unan-
imous agreement among the individuals about the probability of certain events,
this agreement should be preserved collectively. We distinguish between di¤erent
versions of this requirement. The most familiar one is the following:
Consensus preservation. For all A 2  and all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for all i,
Pi(A) = 1, then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
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A second, less demanding version of the requirement is restricted to events in
the sub-agenda X of premises.
Consensus preservation on X (on premises). For all A 2 X and all
P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for all i, Pi(A) = 1, then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Restricting consensus preservation in this way may be plausible because a con-
sensus on any event outsideX may be considered less compelling than a consensus
on a premise in X, for reasons similar to those for which we restricted event-wise
independence to premises. A consensus on a non-basic event could be spuriousin
the sense that there might not be any agreement on its basis (see Mongin 2005).7
We also consider a third version of consensus preservation, which is still re-
stricted to premises, but refers to conditional probabilities. It says that if all
individuals assign a conditional probability of 1 to some premise given another,
then this should be preserved collectively.8
Conditional consensus preservation on X (on premises). For all A;B 2
X and all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for all i, Pi(AjB) = 1 (provided Pi(B) 6= 0), then
PP1;:::;Pn(AjB) = 1 (provided PP1;:::;Pn(B) 6= 0).
6Equivalently, one can demand the preservation of any unanimously assigned probability 0.
7In our companion paper (Dietrich and List 2014), we make the opposite move of extending
consensus preservation to events outside the agenda, i.e., we extend it to events constructible
from events in the agenda using conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union), or negation
(complementation). In the present paper, there is no point in extending consensus preservation
to other events, since there are no events outside the agenda constructible from events in it (as
a -algebra, the agenda is closed under the relevant operations).
8We are indebted to Richard Bradley for suggesting this formulation of the requirement.
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Conditional consensus preservation on X is equivalent to another requirement.
This says that if all individuals agree that some premise implies another with
probabilistic certainty (i.e., the probability of the rst event occurring without
the second is zero), then that agreement should be preserved collectively.
Implication preservation on X (on premises). For all events A;B 2 X
and all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for all i, Pi(AnB) = 0, then PP1;:::;Pn(AnB) = 0.
The equivalence between conditional consensus preservation onX and implica-
tion preservation onX follows from the fact that the clause Pi(AjB) = 1 (provided
Pi(B) 6= 0) is equivalent to Pi(BnA) = 0, and the clause PP1;:::;Pn(AjB) = 1
(provided PP1;:::;Pn(B) 6= 0)is equivalent to PP1;:::;Pn(BnA) = 0. Thus the state-
ment of conditional consensus preservation on X can be reduced to that of impli-
cation preservation on X (except that the roles of A and B are swapped).
This equivalence also illuminates the relationship between conditional con-
sensus preservation on X and consensus preservation on X, because the former,
re-formulated as implication preservation on X, clearly implies the latter. Simply
note that, in the statement of implication preservation onX, taking B = Ac yields
P (AnB) = P (A), so that a unanimous zero probability of any event A in X must
be preserved, which is equivalent to consensus preservation on X.
In fact, conditional consensus preservation on X, when re-formulated as im-
plication preservation on X, is also easily seen to be equivalent to a further
unanimity-preservation requirement, which refers to unanimous assignments of
probability 1 to a union of two events in X (just note that AnB has probability 0
if and only if Ac[B has probability 1). This also shows that conditional consensus
preservation on X is logically weaker than consensus preservation in its original
form (on all of ), since it does not require preservation of unanimous assignments
of probability 1 to intersections of two events in X, or unions or intersections of
more than two events in X.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between the dif-
ferent consensus-preservation requirements (in part (a)) and adds another simple
but useful observation (in part (b)).
Proposition 1 (a) For any sub-agenda X of , conditional consensus preserva-
tion on X
 implies consensus preservation on X;
 is implied by (global) consensus preservation;
 is equivalent to implication preservation on X, and to each of the following
two requirements:
[8i Pi(A[B) = 1]) PP1;:::;Pn(A[B) = 1, for all A;B 2 X, P1; :::; Pn 2 P;
[8i Pi(A\B) = 0]) PP1;:::;Pn(A\B) = 0, for all A;B 2 X, P1; :::; Pn 2 P.
(b) For the maximal sub-agenda X = , all of these requirements are equivalent.
9
4 A class of applications
So far, all our examples of opinion pooling problems have involved events repre-
sented by propositions in natural language, such as it will rain. As argued in our
companion paper (Dietrich and List 2014), the assumption that the agenda is a
-algebra is often unnatural in such cases. But there is a second class of applica-
tions, in which it is more natural to dene the agenda as a -algebra () and to
restrict the independence requirement to some sub-agenda X. Suppose we wish to
estimate the distribution of a real-valued or vector-valued variable, such as rainfall
or the number of insurance claims in some period. Here, the set of worlds 
 could
be R, Z, N, or f0; 1; :::;mg, or it could be Rk, Zk, Nk, or f0; 1; :::;mgk (for natural
numbers m and k). In such cases, the focus on the -algebra of events is more
realistic. First, we may need a full probability distribution on that -algebra.
Second, individuals may be able to come up with such a probability distribution,
because, in practice, they can do the following:
 rst choose some parametric class of probability functions (e.g., the class of
Gaussian distributions if 
 = R, Poisson distributions if 
 = N, or binomial
distributions if 
 = f0; 1; :::;mg);
 then estimate the relevant parameter(s) of the distribution (e.g., the mean
and standard deviation in the case of a Gaussian distribution).
Because the agenda in this kind of application (e.g., the -algebra of Borel
sets over R, or the power set of N) contains very complicated events, it would
be implausible to require event-wise independent aggregation for all such events.
For instance, suppose 
 = R, and consider the event that a numbers distance to
the nearest prime exceeds 37. It would seem articial to determine the collective
probability for that event without paying attention to the probabilities of other
events. Here, the sub-agenda X on which event-wise independence is plausible is
likely to be much smaller than the full -algebra .
Let us give a concrete example. Let  consist of the Borel-measurable subsets
of 
 = R. A natural sub-agenda of  isX = [!2Rf( 1; !]; (!;1)g. If we require
independence on X with a uniform decision criterion D = DA (A 2 X), where
D(t1; :::; tn) =
1
n
t1+   + 1ntn, we obtain a unique pooling function F : Pn ! P,
because the collective probabilities forX uniquely extend to a probability function
on the entire -algebra . Alternatively, one might require independence on the
smaller sub-agenda X = [!2f 1;+1gf( 1; !]; (!;1)g, still with the same uniform
decision criterion D. This under-determines the pooling function F : Pn ! P,
because probability assignments for X do not uniquely extend to all of . To ll
this gap, one might dene the collective probability function as the unique normal
distribution which assigns the specied probabilities to ( 1; 1] and ( 1;+1],
as determined by the decision criterion D.9
9For those special proles of individual probability functions for which the collective prob-
abilities for ( 1; 1] and ( 1;+1] coincide or one of them is zero or one, there is no such
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Let us summarize how the present kinds of applications di¤er from the above-
mentioned applications involving events represented by natural-language proposi-
tions such as it will rainor atmospheric CO2 causes global warming:
(1) 
 is a subset of R or of a higher-dimensional Euclidean space Rk, rather
than a set of possible worldsspecied by natural-language descriptions;
(2) it is often natural to arrive at a probability function by choosing a parametric
family of such functions (such as the family of Gaussian distributions) and
then specifying the relevant parameter(s), while this approach would seem
ad hoc in the other kind of application;
(3) in practice, we may be interested in a probability function on the entire
-algebra (e.g., in order to compute the mean of the distribution and other
moments), rather than just in the probabilities of specic events.
5 When is opinion pooling neutral on premises?
We now show that, if there are certain kinds of interconnections among the
premises in X, any pooling function satisfying independence on X and consen-
sus preservation in one of the senses introduced must be neutral on X. This
means that the pattern of dependence between individual and collective probabil-
ity assignments is the same for all premises. In the next section, we turn to the
question of whether our axioms imply linear pooling on premises, over and above
neutrality.
Formally, a pooling function for agenda  is neutral on X ( ) if there exists
some function D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] the local pooling criterion for events in X 
such that, for every prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 Pn, the collective probability of any event
A in X is given by
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)):
If X = , neutrality onX reduces to neutrality in the familiar global sense, briey
mentioned in the introduction.
Our rst result uses the strongest consensus-preservation requirement we have
introduced, namely globalconsensus preservation (on all of ). Here, we obtain
the neutrality conclusion as soon as the sub-agenda of premises satises a very
mild condition: it is non-nested. We call a sub-agenda X nested if it has the
form X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for some set of events X+ which is linearly ordered
by set-inclusion, and non-nested otherwise. For instance, X = fA;Acg is nested
(take X+ := fAg), as is X = fA;Ac; A\B; (A\B)cg (take X+ = fA;A\Bg). By
contrast, X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg is non-nested when the events A and B are logically
independent. Also, the above-mentioned sub-agendaX = fA1; Ac1; A2; Ac2; A3; Ac3g
normal distribution. A di¤erent, non-normal extension must then be used.
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in our climate-change example is non-nested. Further examples are given in our
companion paper (Dietrich and List 2014).
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested (nite10) sub-agenda X of the -algebra ,
every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
(global) consensus preservation is neutral on X.
(b) For any nested sub-agenda X of the -algebra  (where X is nite and
distinct from f?;
g), there exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satis-
fying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation but violating
neutrality on X.
The possibilities arising for nested X are illustrated by variants of the two
pooling functions constructed in Section 4, where  is the Borel -algebra on

 = R and X is one of the nested sub-agendas [!2Rf( 1; !]; (!;1)g and
[!2f 1;+1gf( 1; !]; (!;1)g. To obtain pooling functions that are not neutral
on X, as described in part (b), we must avoid the use of a uniform decision crite-
rion on all elements of X.11 Theorem 1 continues to hold if we weaken consensus
preservation to conditional consensus preservation on premises, as shown next:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra ,
every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
conditional consensus preservation on X is neutral on X.
(b) For any nested sub-agenda X of the -algebra  (where X is nite and
not f?;
g), there exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying inde-
pendence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X but violating
neutrality on X.
However, if we weaken the consensus-preservation requirement further namely
to consensus preservation on X then the neutrality conclusion follows only if
the events within the sub-agendaX exhibit stronger interconnections. Specically,
the set X must be path-connected, as originally dened in binary judgment-
aggregation theory (often under the name total blockedness; see Nehring and
Puppe 2010). To dene path-connectedness formally, we begin with a preliminary
notion. Given the sub-agendaX, we say that an event A 2 X conditionally entails
another event B 2 X written A ` B if there is a subset Y  X (possibly
empty, but not uncountably innite) such that fAg [ Y entails B, where, for
non-triviality, Y [ fAg and Y [ fBcg are each consistent. In our climate-change
10The niteness assumption in Theorems 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), and
6(a) could be replaced by the assumption that the -algebra generated by X is  (rather than a
sub--algebra of ). It might be that some of these niteness assumptions (or their substitutes)
especially in Theorems 1(b), 2(b), and 4(b) could be dropped.
11For example, for every event of the form A = ( 1; !], we might use the decision criterion
dened by DA(t1; :::; tn) = ( 1n t1 +   + 1n tn)2, and for every event of the form A = (!;1), we
might use the decision criterion dened by DA(t1; :::; tn) = 1  ( 1n (1  t1) +   + 1n (1  tn))2.
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example with sub-agenda X = fA1; Ac1; A2; Ac2; A3; Ac3g, A1 conditionally entails
A3 (take Y = fA2g), but none of Ac1, Ac2, and A3 conditionally entails any event
in X other than itself.
We call the sub-agenda X path-connected if any two events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g
can be connected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events
A1; :::; Ak 2 X (k  1) such that A = A1 ` A2 ` ::: ` Ak = B, and
non-path-connected otherwise. For example, suppose X = fA;Ac; B;Bc; C; Ccg,
where fA;B;Cg is a partition of 
 (and A;B;C 6= ?). Then X is path-
connected. For instance, to see that there is a path from A to B, note that
A ` Cc (take Y = ?) and Cc ` B (take Y = fAcg). Many sub-agendas are
not path-connected, including all nested sub-agendas X (6= f?;
g) and the sub-
agenda X = fA1; Ac1; A2; Ac2; A3; Ac3g in the climate-change example.
Theorem 3 (a) For any path-connected (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra
, every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
consensus preservation on X is neutral on X.
(b) For any non-path-connected (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , there
exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
consensus preservation on X but violating neutrality on X.
6 When is opinion pooling linear on premises?
Our next question is whether, and for which sub-agendas X, our requirements on
an opinion pooling function imply linearity on premises, over and above neutrality.
Formally, a pooling function for agenda  is called linear on X ( ) if there
exist real-valued weights w1; :::; wn  0 with w1+ :::+wn = 1 such that, for every
prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 Pn, the collective probability of any event A in X is given by
PP1;:::;Pn(A) =
nX
i=1
wiPi(A).
If X = , linearity on X reduces to linearity in the global sense, familiar from
the established literature.
As in the case of neutrality, whether our axioms imply linearity on a given sub-
agenda X depends on how the events in X are connected and which consensus-
preservation requirement we impose on the pooling function. Again, our rst
result uses the strongest consensus-preservation requirement and applies to a very
large class of sub-agendas.
Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra 
with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying inde-
pendence on X and (global) consensus preservation is linear on X.
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(b) For any other sub-agenda X of the -algebra  (where X is nite and
distinct from f?;
g), there exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satis-
fying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation but violating
linearity on X.
If we weaken consensus preservation to conditional consensus preservation on
X, the linearity conclusion still follows, but only if the sub-agenda X is non-
simplea condition stronger than non-nestedness, but still weaker than path-
connectedness.12 The notion of non-simplicity also comes from binary judgment-
aggregation theory, where the non-simple agendas are those that are susceptible
to majority inconsistencies, the judgment-aggregation analogues of Condorcets
paradox (e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2010, Dietrich and List 2007). Formally, a sub-
agenda X is non-simple if it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y  X of more
than two (but not uncountably many) events, and simple otherwise. (A set Y is
minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but all its proper subsets are consistent.)
For example, the sub-agenda X = fA1; Ac1; A2; Ac2; A3; Ac3g in our climate-change
example is non-simple, since its three-element subset Y = fA1; A2; Ac3g is minimal
inconsistent. By contrast, a sub-agenda of the form X = fA;Acg is simple.
Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra ,
every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
conditional consensus preservation on X is linear on X.
(b) For any simple sub-agenda X of the -algebra  (where X is nite and
distinct from f?;
g), there exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satis-
fying independence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X but
violating linearity on X.
Finally, if we impose only the weakest of our three consensus-preservation
requirements consensus preservation onX then the linearity conclusion follows
only if the sub-agenda X is path-connected and satises an additional condition.
A su¢ cient such condition is partitionality. A sub-agenda X is partitional if
some subset Y  X partitions 
 into at least three non-empty events (where Y
is nite or countably innite), and non-partitional otherwise. As an illustration,
recall our earlier example of a sub-agenda given by X = fA;Ac; B;Bc; C; Ccg,
where fA;B;Cg partitions 
 (with A;B;C 6= ?). This sub-agenda is both path-
connected (as mentioned above) and partitional.
Theorem 6 (a) For any path-connected and partitional (nite) sub-agenda X of
the -algebra , every pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying indepen-
dence on X and consensus preservation on X is linear on X.
(b) For any non-pathconnected (nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , there
exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying independence on X and
consensus preservation on X but violating linearity on X.
12To be precise, path-connectedness implies non-simplicity as long as X 6= f?;
g.
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It is clear from part (b) that path-connectedness of the premises is necessary
for the linearity conclusion to follow. The other condition, partitionality, is not
necessary. But it is not redundant:
Proposition 2 For some path-connected and non-partitional (nite) sub-agenda
X of the -algebra , there exists a pooling function F : Pn ! P satisfying
independence on X (even neutrality on X) and consensus preservation on X but
violating linearity on X.13
7 Classic results as special cases
As should be evident, if we apply our results to the maximal sub-agenda X = ,
we obtain classic results (by Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981) as
special cases. To see why this is the case, note three things. First, when X = ,
our various conditions on the sub-agenda X all reduce to a single condition on
the size of the -algebra .
Lemma 1 For the maximal sub-agenda X =  (where  6= f
;?g), the con-
ditions of non-nestedness, non-simplicity, path-connectedness, and partitionality
are all equivalent, and they all hold if and only if jj > 4, i.e., if and only if  is
not of the form fA;Ac;
;?g.
Second, when X = , independence, neutrality, and linearity on X reduce to
independence, neutrality, and linearity in the familiar globalsense, as already
noted. Third, our various consensus-preservation requirements all become equiv-
alent, by Proposition 1.
In consequence, our six theorems reduce to two classic results:14
 Theorems 1 to 3 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are neutral if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4;
 Theorems 4 to 6 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are linear if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4.
The case jj < 4 is uninteresting because it means that  is the trivial -
algebra f
;?g. Let us slightly re-formulate these two results:
Corollary 1 For the -algebra ,
13In this proposition, we assume that the agenda  is not very small, i.e., contains more than
23 = 8 events (e.g.,  = 2
 with j
j > 3). Note that, as  is a -algebra, it has the size 2k for
some k 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g or is innite.
14We require no restriction to a nite , as observed in footnote 10.
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(a) if jXj > 4, every pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and consensus preservation is linear (and by implication neutral);
(b) if jXj = 4, there exists a pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying indepen-
dence and consensus preservation but violating neutrality (and thereby also
violating linearity).
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A Proofs
We now give all proofs.In Section A.1, we prove parts (a) of all our theorems by
reducing them to results in the companion paper (Dietrich and List 2014). In
Sections A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5, we prove parts (b) of Theorems 1, 3, 4, and 5.
Parts (b) of Theorems 2 and 6 require no separate proofs: Theorem 2(b) follows
from Theorem 1(b) (since consensus preservation implies conditional consensus
preservation on X by Proposition 1) and Theorem 6(b) follows from Theorem
3(b) (since non-neutrality on X implies non-linearity on X). In Section A.6, we
prove Proposition 2.
A.1 Proof of part (a) of each theorem
We now prove Theorems 1(a) to 6(a). To do so, we rst relate premise-based opin-
ion pooling to opinion pooling on a general agenda as introduced in the companion
paper. We begin by generalizing the present papers framework to agendas that
need not be -algebras. In general, an agenda is a non-empty setX of events (each
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of which is of the form A  
), where X is closed under complementation (i.e.,
A 2 X , Ac 2 X). It contains the events on which opinions are formed. Given
an agenda X, an opinion function is a function P : X ! [0; 1] which is coherent,
i.e., extendable to a probability function on the -algebra (X) generated by X
(i.e., the smallest -algebra which includes X, constructible by closing X under
countable unions and complements). Let PX be the set of all opinion functions
for agenda X. If X is a -algebra, PX consists of all probability functions on
X, in line with the notation used above. An opinion pooling function for agenda
X is a function PnX ! PX which assigns to each prole (P1; :::; Pn) of individual
opinion functions a collective opinion function, usually denoted PP1;:::;Pn. We call
the pooling function linear and neutral, respectively, if it is linear and neutral on
X in line with the denition above.
Crucially, a pooling function for a -algebra  induces new pooling functions
for any sub-agendas X on which it is independent. Formally, a pooling function
F : Pn ! P for agenda  is said to induce the pooling function F 0 : PnX ! PX
for (sub-)agenda X if F and F 0 generate the same collective opinions within X,
i.e.,
F 0(P1jX ; :::; PnjX) = F (P1; :::; Pn)jX for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P
(and if, in addition, PX = fP jX : P 2 Pg, where this addition holds auto-
matically whenever X is nite or (X) = 15). Our axiomatic requirements on a
pooling function for agenda  i.e., independence on a sub-agenda X and various
consensus requirements should be compared with the following requirements on
a pooling function for the agenda X (introduced and discussed in the companion
paper). The rst two requirements are unrestricted versions of independence and
consensus preservation:
Independence. For each event A 2 X, there exists a function DA : [0; 1]n !
[0; 1] (the local pooling criterion forA) such that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A))
for any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX .
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 X and P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if Pi(A) = 1 for
all individuals i, then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Note the following criterion for the existence of induced pooling functions:
Lemma 2 (cf. Dietrich and List 2014, Lemma 6) If a pooling function for a
-algebra  is independent on a sub-agenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ),
then it induces a pooling function for agenda X.
15In this case, each opinion function in PX is extendable not just to a probability function
on (X), but also to one on . Probability theorists will be aware that the extendability of a
probability function to a larger -algebra cannot be taken for granted.
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The next two axiomatic requirements are two di¤erent extensions of consen-
sus preservation, namely to either implicitly revealed or unrevealed beliefs. An
individual is explicitly revealed beliefs are given by the individuals submitted
opinion function Pi. Her implicitly revealed beliefs are given by the probabilities
of events in (X)nX which are implied by her explicitly revealed beliefs, i.e., hold
under every extension of Pi to a probability function on (X). If, for instance, Pi
assigns probability 1 to A 2 X, then the agent implicitly reveals certainty of all
events B  A in (X)nX. The following axiom extends consensus preservation
to implicitly revealed beliefs:
Implicit consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if
each Pi implies certainty of A (i.e., P i(A) = 1 for every extension P i of Pi to a
probability function on (X)), then so does PP1;:::;Pn.
By contrast, individual is unrevealed beliefs are any probabilistic beliefs which
she privately holds relative to events in (X)nX and which cannot be inferred
from the submitted opinion function Pi because di¤erent extensions of Pi assign
di¤erent probabilities to the events in question. The following axiom requires the
collective opinion function to be compatible with any unanimously held certainty
of an event  including any unrevealed certainty, which is not implied by the
submitted opinion functions but is consistent with them. This ensures that no
consensus (not even an unrevealed consensus) is ever overruled.
Consensus compatibility. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if each Pi
is consistent with certainty of A (i.e., P i(A) = 1 for some extension P i of Pi to a
probability function on (X)), then so is PP1;:::;Pn.
A nal requirement pertains to conditional beliefs. Note that, based on indi-
vidual is opinion function Pi, the conditional belief Pi(AjB) = Pi(A \ B)=Pi(B)
of one agenda event A given another B (where Pi(B) 6= 0) may be undened,
since we may have A\B 62 X so that Pi(A\B) is undened. Hence, if the agent
happens to be privately certain of A given B, then this conditional certainty may
be unrevealed. Our axiom of conditional consensus compatibility requires that any
(possibly unrevealed) unanimous conditional certainty should not be overruled. In
fact, we require something subtly stronger: any set of (possibly unrevealed) unan-
imous conditional certainties should not be overruled (see the companion paper
for details).
Conditional consensus compatibility. For all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , and all nite
sets S of pairs (A;B) of events in X, if every opinion function Pi is consistent
with certainty of A given B for all (A;B) in S (i.e., some extension P i of Pi to a
probability function on (X) satises P i(AjB) = 1 for all pairs (A;B) 2 S such
that Pi(B) 6= 0), then so is the collective opinion function PP1;:::;Pn.
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The following lemma shows how properties of a pooling function for a -
algebra translate into corresponding properties of an induced pooling function for
a sub-agenda:
Lemma 3 (cf. Dietrich and List 2014, Lemma 4) Suppose pooling function F
for -algebra  induces pooling function F 0 for sub-agenda X (where X is nite
or (X) = ). Then:
 F 0 is independent (respectively neutral, linear) if and only if F is independent
(respectively neutral, linear) on X,
 F 0 is consensus-preserving if and only if F is consensus-preserving on X,
 F 0 is consensus-compatible if F is consensus-preserving,
 F 0 is conditional-consensus-compatible if F is conditional-consensus-pre-
serving on X.
This lemma follows from a more general result:
Lemma 4 (cf. Dietrich and List 2014, Lemma 5) Consider a -algebra  and a
sub-agenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ). Any pooling function for X is
(a) induced by some pooling function for agenda ,
(b) independent (respectively neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pooling
function for agenda  is independent (respectively neutral, linear) on X,
where everycan be replaced by some,
(c) consensus-preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving on X, where everycan be replaced by some,
(d) consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving,
(e) conditional-consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling func-
tion for agenda  is conditional-consensus-preserving on X
(where in (d) and (e) the only ifclaim assumes that X is nite).
Proof of parts (a) of Theorems 1-6. Using the above translation machinery, one
can reduce Theorem 1(a) to the companion papers Theorem 1(a), Theorem 2(a)
to the companion papers Theorem 2(a), and so on until Theorem 6(a). Since
the reduction is analogous for each theorem, we only spell it out for Theorem
1. Let X be a non-nested nite sub-agenda of the -algebra agenda , and let
F : Pn ! P be independent on X and (globally) consensus preserving. By
Lemma 2, F induces a pooling function F 0 for agenda X, which is independent
and consensus-compatible by Lemma 3, hence neutral by the companion papers
Theorem 1(a). So F is neutral on X by Lemma 3. 
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1(b)
We now write 1 and 0 for the n-dimensional vectors (1; :::; 1) and (0; :::; 0), re-
spectively. We draw on a measure-theoretic fact:
Lemma 5 (cf. Dietrich and List 2014, Lemma 7) Every probability function on
a nite sub--algebra of -algebra  can be extended to a probability function on
.
Proof of Theorem 1(b). Consider a nite nested sub-agenda X 6= f?;
g of the
-algebra agenda . (As will become clear, niteness could be replaced by the
assumption that (X) = . Under this alternative assumption, the Claimbelow
can be skipped, and the rest of the proof remains almost una¤ected.) We construct
a pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn for agenda  with all relevant properties.
Without loss of generality, let ?;
 2 X.
Claim. If Theorem 1(b) holds in the case that (X) = , then it holds in
general.
Let Theorem 1(b) hold in the special case. Let 0 := (X) ( ). By
assumption, there is a pooling function F 0 : Pn0 ! P0 with all relevant properties.
Let A be the set of atoms of the (nite) -algebra 0. We dene F : Pn ! P
as follows. Consider P1; :::; Pn 2 P. Let P 0 := F 0(P1j0 ; :::; Pnj0). For all
A 2 A such that P 0(A) 6= 0, there is an individual iA such that PiA(A) 6= 0, since
otherwise everyone assigns probability one to 
nA while P 0(
nA) 6= 1, violating
consensus-preservation. By Lemma 5, P 0 can be extended to a probability function
P on . As is clear from that lemmas proof (in the companion paper), we may
assume without loss of generality that16
P (jA) = PiA(jA) for each A 2 A such that P (A) 6= 0:
Now let F (P1; :::; Pn) be this P . It remains to show that the pooling function F
just dened inherits all relevant properties from F 0. This is clear for independence
onX and non-neutrality onX. To show that F is (globally) consensus-preserving,
consider B 2  and P1; :::; Pn 2 P such that P1(B) =    = Pn(B) = 1.
To show that P (B) = 1, where P := F (P1; :::; Pn), note rst that P (B) =P
A2A:P (A) 6=0 P (BjA)P (A). Here (in the notation above) each P (BjA) equals
PiA(BjA), which equals 1 as PiA(B) = 1. So P (B) =
P
A2A:P (A) 6=0 P (A) = 1.
This proves the claim.
Now let (X) = , drawing on the above Claim. As X is nested, we may
express it as X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for some subset X+  X which is linearly
ordered and contains both ? and 
.
16In that proof it su¢ ces to choose the QAs appropriately, since each QA equals P (jA),
provided P (A) 6= 0.
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As an ingredient of our construction, we consider any pooling function for
agenda  which is neutral (at least) on X and consensus-preserving and whose
pooling criterion on X, denoted D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1], is at least weakly increas-
ing in each argument. (For instance, we might use dictatorship by individual 1,
given by (P1; :::; Pn) 7! P1, with pooling criterion given by D(t1; :::; tn) = t1.) As
X 6= f?;
g, there is some A 2 Xnf
;?g. As A 6= 
;?, there are P1; :::; Pn 2 P
which all assign probability 1=2 to A (hence to Ac), so that the collective prob-
abilities of A and of Ac are each given by D(1=2; :::; 1=2). As these probabilities
sum to 1, it follows that
D(1=2; 1=2; :::; 1=2) = 1=2: (1)
We now transform this pooling function, which is neutral on X, into a pooling
function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn which is non-neutral on X, but still independent
on X and consensus-preserving. To do so, we consider a function T : [0; 1]! [0; 1]
such that (i) T (1=2) 6= 1=2, (ii) T (0) = 0 and T (1) = 1, (iii) T is at least
weakly increasing, and (iv) T is Lipschitz continuous, i.e., there is a K > 0
such that jT (x)  T (y)j  K jx  yj for all x; y 2 [0; 1]. (T could be dened
by T (x) = minf2x; 1g.) Now consider any P1; :::; Pn 2 P. We have to dene
PP1;:::;Pn. We write P for the result of applying the neutral pooling function to
(P1; :::; Pn). To anticipate, our denition will imply that
PP1;:::;Pn(C) = T (P (C)) whenever C 2 X+.
As a rst step towards our denition, we dene PP1;:::;Pn on the subdomaineX := fA \B : A;B 2 Xg = fBnA : A;B 2 X+ such that A  Bg:
The restriction of PP1;:::;Pn to eX, to be denoted g, is dened as follows. Each
C 2 eX is uniquely representable as C = BnA with A;B 2 X+ and A  B (and
A = B = ? if C = ?), and we let
g(C) = T (P (B))  T (P (A))
= T (D(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)))  T (D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A))).
It follows that
g(C) =

T (P (C)) = T (D(P1(C); :::; Pn(C))) if C 2 X+
1  T (P (Cc)) = 1  T (D(P1(Cc); :::; Pn(Cc))) if C 2 XnX+, (2)
because, rstly, each C 2 X+ can be written as Cn? where C;? 2 X+, and,
secondly, each C 2 XnX+ can be written as 
nCc where 
; Cc 2 X+ and where
T (P (
)) = T (1) = 1.
Note that eX is a semi-ring in 
, since (i) ? 2 eX, (ii) C;C 0 2 eX ) C\C 0 2 eX,
and (iii) for all C;C 0 2 eX, the di¤erence CnC 0 is a union of nitely many in
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fact, at most two events in eX. We next show that the function g on this semi-
ring is -additive. First, g is nitely additive, i.e., for all disjoint C1; C2 2 eX, if
C1 [ C2 2 eX, then g(C1 [ C2) = g(C1) + g(C2), by denition of g and additivity
of P . To show -additivity, consider pairwise disjoint C1; C2; ::: 2 eX such that
[1m=1Cm 2 eX. We have to show that
M := g([1m=1Cm) 
MX
m=1
g(Cm)! 0 as M !1:
For allM 2 f1; 2; :::g, note that the di¤erence ([1m=1Cm) n
 [Mm=1Cm = [1m=M+1Cm
need not belong to eX, but can be partitioned into a nite set CM of events ineX (as [1m=1Cm belongs the the semi-ring eX). So, CM [ fC1; :::; CMg partitions
[1m=1Cm. Careful inspection of gs denition reveals that M =
P
C2CM g(C). So,
as g(C)  KP (C) for each C 2 eX (by denition of g and property (iv) of T ), M 
K
P
C2CM P (C) = KP ([1m=M+1Cm). As M ! 1 we have P ([1m=M+1Cm) ! 0
(by -additivity of P ), and so M ! 0, as required.
As g is non-negative, -additive, and also -nite (i.e., 
 is a union of count-
ably many events in eX of nite g-measure, which trivially holds as 
 2 eX),
Caratheodorys Extension Theorem tells us that g extends uniquely to a mea-
sure on ( eX) = (X) = . Let PP1;:::;Pn be this extension. PP1;:::;Pn is indeed a
probability function since PP1;:::;Pn(
) = 1 as 
 2 eX and g(
) = T (1) = 1.
Finally, we must prove that the pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn, as just
dened, is independent on X, (globally) consensus-preserving, and non-neutral on
X.
Independence on X. This holds because, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, the function
PP1;:::;Pn extends g, which satises (2). Note that the pooling criterion DC for
C 2 X+ is dened as T  D, while the pooling criterion DC for C 2 CnX+ is
dened by t 7! 1  T D(1  t).
Non-neutrality on X. Here it su¢ ces to show that, for some C 2 Xnf
;?g,
the pooling criteria DC and DCc di¤er. This follows from the following argument.
First, Xnf
;?g 6= ? as X 6= f?;
g. So we may pick C;Cc 2 Xnf
;?g; say,
assume C 2 X+ and Cc 2 XnX+. So, as just shown, DC = T  D and DCc =
1  T D(1  ). Hence DC 6= DCc, since DC(1=2; :::; 1=2) 6= DCc(1=2; :::; 1=2), as
is clear from the fact that T (1=2) 6= 1=2 and that
DAj(1=2; :::; 1=2) = T D(1=2; :::; 1=2) = T (1=2),
DAcj(1=2; :::; 1=2) = 1  T D(1  1=2; :::; 1  1=2)
= 1  T D(1=2; :::; 1=2) = 1  T (1=2).
Consensus preservation. Let P1; :::; Pn 2 P and A 2  such that P1(A) =
   = Pn(A) = 1. We show that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1. Let P be the result of pooling
P1; :::; Pn using the (at least on X) neutral pooling function dened above. As
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that pooling function is consensus-preserving, P (A) = 1. It su¢ ces to show that
PP1;:::;Pn  KP , as this implies that PP1;:::;Pn(Ac)  KP (Ac) = K(1   P (A)) =
K(1   1) = 0, so that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1. Now, to show that PP1;:::;Pn  KP , note
rst that, by property (iv) of T , g  KP j eX , and so KP j eX   g  0. Since g
and KP j eX , and hence also KP j eX   g, are -additive, -nite and non-negative
functions on the semi-ring eX, each of them extends uniquely to a measure on
( eX) =  by Caratheodorys Extension Theorem. The rst two extensions are
PP1;:::;Pn and KP , respectively. So the third one must be KP   PP1;:::;Pn. Hence
KP   PP1;:::;Pn  0, and thus PP1;:::;Pn  KP . 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3(b)
Let X be a non-path-connected and nite sub-agenda of the -algebra . As in
the proof of Theorem 1(b), we begin by proving that we may assume without loss
of generality that (X) = .
Claim 1. If Theorem 3(b) holds when (X) = , then it holds in general.
Assume Theorem 3(b) holds if (X) =  and let 0 := (X) ( ). By
assumption, there exists F 0 : Pn0 ! P0 which, on X, is independent, consensus-
preserving, and non-neutral. Consider some F : Pn ! P which, for any
P1; :::; Pn 2 P, generates a probability function inP extending F 0(P1j0 ; :::; Pnj0)
(where such an extension exists by Lemma 5 and niteness of 0). The so-dened
F inherits all relevant properties from F 0: it is, on X, independent, consensus
preserving, and non-neutral. This proves the claim.
Now let (X) = . Notationally, for any sub--algebra   , let A() be its
set of atoms (i.e., minimal elements of ~nf?g). We now dene a pooling function
for agenda  and show that it has the desired properties. As an ingredient to the
denition, let D0 : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] and D00 : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] be the local pooling
criteria of two distinct linear pooling functions; and let A 2 Xnf?;
g be a (by
assumption existing) event such that not for all A 2 Xnf?;
g there is A `` A,
where `` is the transitive closure of `. Consider any (P1; :::; Pn) 2 Pn. To dene
PP1;:::;Pn 2 P, we start by dening probability functions on two sub--algebras of
, denoted 0 and 00 and dened as the -algebras generated by the sets
X 0 : = fA 2 X : A `` B for both B 2 fA;Acgg,
X 00 : = fA 2 X : A `` B for no B 2 fA;Acgg,
respectively. (X 0 and X 00 might be empty, in which case 0 and 00, respectively,
are f?;
g.) Let P 0P1;:::;Pn 2 P0 and P 00P1;:::;Pn 2 P00 be dened by
P 0P1;:::;Pn(A) = D
0(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 0,
P 00P1;:::;Pn(A) = D
00(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 00.
These two functions are indeed probability functions (on 0 and 00,respectively),
as they are linear averages of of probability functions.
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Claim 2. The -algebras 0 and 00 are logically independent, that is: if A0 2 0
and A00 2 00 are non-empty, so is A0 \ A00.
Suppose the contrary. Then, as each non-empty element of 0 includes an atom
of 0 and hence a non-empty intersection of events in X 0, and similarly for 00,
there are consistent sets Y 0  X 0 and Y 00  X 00 such that Y 0 [ Y 00 is inconsistent.
Let Y be a minimal inconsistent subset of Y 0 [ Y 00. Then Y is not a subset of Y 0
or Y 00, as Y 0 and Y 00 are consistent. So there are A 2 Y \ X 0 and B 2 Y \ X 00.
Note that A ` Bc, a contradiction since A 2 X 0 and Bc 2 X 00. This proves Claim
2.
We now extend P 0P1;:::;Pn and P
00
P1;:::;Pn
to a probability function on the -algebra
~ := (0 [00) = (X 0 [X 00), in such a way that the events in 0 are probabilis-
tically independent of those in 00. By Claim 2, the atoms of ~ are precisely the
intersections of an atom of 0 and one of 00: A(~) = fA0 \A00 : A0 2 A(0); A00 2
A(00)g. Let ~PP1;:::;Pn be the unique measure on ~ that behaves as follows on the
atoms:
~PP1;:::;Pn(A
0 \ A00) = P 0P1;:::;Pn(A0)P 00P1;:::;Pn(A00); (3)
for all A0 2 A(0); A00 2 A(00). Now ~PP1;:::;Pn is a probability function asX
A2A(~)
~PP1;:::;Pn(A) =
X
A02A(0);A002A(00)
P 0P1;:::;Pn(A
0)P 00P1;:::;Pn(A
00)
=
X
A02A(0)
P 0P1;:::;Pn(A
0)
X
A002A(00)
P 00P1;:::;Pn(A
00)| {z }
=1
= 1.
Check that restricting ~PP1;:::;Pn to 
0 and 00 yields P 0P1;:::;Pn and P
00
P1;:::;Pn
, respec-
tively. So
~PP1;:::;Pn(A) =

D0(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 0
D00(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 00. (4)
Before we can extend ~PP1;:::;Pn to the full -algebra , we prove another claim.
For all A 2 X such that A `` A but not A `` Ac, dene
AP1;:::;Pn :=

A if Pi(A) > 0 for some i
Ac if Pi(A) = 0 for all i.
Claim 3. For all atoms C of ~ (= (X 0[X 00)) with ~PP1;:::;Pn(C) > 0, the event
C \ (\A2X: A``A and not A``AcAP1;:::;Pn) is an atom of .
Let C be as specied, and write CP1;:::;Pn for the event in question. As noted
above, C = A0\A00 with A0 2 A(0) and A00 2 A(00). By ~PP1;:::;Pn(C) > 0 and (3),
we have ~P 0P1;:::;Pn(A
0) > 0 and ~P 00P1;:::;Pn(A
00) > 0. Since A0 2 A(0), we may write
A0 = \A2Y 0A for some set Y 0  X 0 containing exactly one member of each pair
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A;Ac 2 X 0. Similarly, A00 = \A2Y 00A for some set Y 00  X 00 containing exactly one
member of each pair A;Ac 2 X 00. Note also that \A2X: A``A and not A``AcAP1;:::;Pn
can be written as \A2YP1;:::;PnA, where the set
YP1;:::;Pn = fAP1;:::;Pn : A 2 X; A `` A; not A `` Acg
consists of exactly one member of each pair A;Ac 2 Xn(X 0 [X 00). So CP1;:::;Pn =
\A2Y 0[Y 00[YP1;:::;PnA, where the set Y 0[Y 00[YP1;:::;Pn consists of exactly one member
of each pairA;Ac 2 X. So, since = (X), CP1;:::;Pn is an atom or is empty. Hence
it su¢ ces to show that CP1;:::;Pn 6= ?. Suppose the contrary. Then Y 0[Y 00[YP1;:::;Pn
is inconsistent, hence has a minimal inconsistent subset Y . We distinguish two
cases and derive a contradiction in each.
Case 1: There is some B 2 Y \ YP1;:::;Pn with A `` B. Consider some
B0 2 Y nfBg. We have (i) not A `` B0 (otherwise by B0 ` Bc we would
have A `` Bc, hence B 2 X 0, a contradiction as B 2 YP1;:::;Pn). Further, (ii)
A `` (B0)c (as A `` B and B ` (B0)c). By (i) and (ii), letting A := (B0)c,
the event AP1;:::;Pn (2 fA;Acg) is well-dened. Since YP1;:::;Pn contains AP1;:::;Pn
(2 fA;Acg) and contains B0 = Ac but not (B0)c = A, we must have AP1;:::;Pn = Ac.
So, for all i, Pi(A) = 0 and hence Pi(B0) = 1. Note that this holds for all
B0 2 Y nfBg. So Pi(\B02YB0) = Pi(B) for all i. Hence, as Y is inconsistent,
Pi(B) = 0 for all i. Thus BP1;:::;Pn = B
c. So Bc 2 YP1;:::;Pn, a contradiction as
B 2 YP1;:::;Pn.
Case 2: There is no B 2 Y \YP1;:::;Pn with A `` B. Then all B 2 Y \YP1;:::;Pn
take the formAP1;:::;Pn = A
c, so that Pi(A) = 0 for all i, i.e., Pi(B) = 1 for all i. So,
(*) Pi(\B2YB) = Pi(\B2Y nYP1;:::;PnB) for all i. Now, either (i) Y  YP1;:::;Pn [ Y 0,
or (ii) Y  YP1;:::;Pn [ Y 00, because otherwise there are A0 2 Y 0 and A00 2 Y 00, and
A0 ` (A00)c, whence A `` (A00)c, a contradiction as (A00)c 2 X 00. First suppose
case (i) holds. Then Y nYP1;:::;Pn  Y 0, and so (*) implies that (**) Pi(\B2YB) 
Pi(\B2Y 0B) = Pi(A0) for all i. Since by assumption ~PP1;:::;Pn(A0) > 0, there is
(by (4 )) at least one i with Pi(A0) > 0, hence by (**) with Pi(\B2YB) > 0. So
\B2YB 6= ?, i.e., Y is consistent, a contradiction. Similarly, in case (ii), one can
show that Y is consistent, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim 3.
Let PP1;:::;Pn be the unique measure on  behaving as follows on any atom C of
. If C takes the form as in Claim 3, i.e., B = C\(\A2X: A``A and not A``AcAP1;:::;Pn)
where C 2 A(~) and ~PP1;:::;Pn(C) > 0, then let PP1;:::;Pn(B) := ~PP1;:::;Pn(C). Oth-
erwise let PP1;:::;Pn(B) := 0.
Claim 4. PP1;:::;Pn extends ~PP1;:::;Pn (in particular, is a probability function).
It su¢ ces to show that PP1;:::;Pn coincides with ~PP1;:::;Pn on A(~). Consider any
C 2 A(~). As  is a renement of ~,
PP1;:::;Pn(C) =
X
B2A():BC
PP1;:::;Pn(B): (5)
There are two cases.
26
Case 1: ~PP1;:::;Pn(C) = 0. Then, for all B 2 A() with B  C, we have
PP1;:::;Pn(B) = 0 (by denition of PP1;:::;Pn), and so by (5) we have PP1;:::;Pn(C) =
0 = ~PP1;:::;Pn(C), as desired.
Case 2: ~PP1;:::;Pn(C) > 0. Then, among all atoms B 2 A() with B  C,
there is by denition of PP1;:::;Pn exactly one such that PP1;:::;Pn(B) > 0 (namely
B = C \ (\A2X: A``A and not A``AcAP1;:::;Pn)), and PP1;:::;Pn(B) = ~PP1;:::;Pn(C). So
by (5) PP1;:::;Pn(C) = ~PP1;:::;Pn(C). This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 5. For all A 2 X such that A `` A and not A `` Ac, PP1;:::;Pn(A) is
1 if, for some individual i, Pi(A) > 0, and 0 otherwise.
By denition of PP1;:::;Pn, all atoms of  with positive probability are subsets of
the event \A2X: A``A and not A``AcAP1;:::;Pn. So this event has probability 1. Hence,
for all A 2 X such that A `` A and not A `` Ac, we have PP1;:::;Pn(AP1;:::;Pn) =
1, and so
PP1;:::;Pn(A) =

1 if AP1;:::;Pn = A, i.e., if Pi(A) > 0 for some i
0 if AP1;:::;Pn = A
c, i.e., if Pi(A) = 0 for all i.
This proves Claim 5.
By Claim 4, we have constructed a well-dened pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7!
PP1;:::;Pn for agenda . By (4) and Claims 4 and 5, we know its behaviour on the
entire sub-agenda X: the pooling function is independent on X and the local
pooling criteria DA of events A 2 X are given by
(i) the linear criterion D0 if A 2 X 0,
(ii) the di¤erent linear criterion D00 if A 2 X 00,
(iii) a non-linear criterion D^ (taking the value 0 at 0 and the value 1 everywhere
else) if A `` A but not A `` Ac,
(iv) the di¤erent non-linear criterion 1  D^(1  ) if not A `` A but A `` Ac.
These pooling criteria also ensure unanimity preservation on X. To check non-
neutrality, it su¢ ces to show that at least two of the four di¤erent types of events
(i)-(iv) do indeed occur. This is so because A is of type (i) or (iii) and because by
assumption there exists an A 2 X such that not A `` A, i.e., such that A has
type (ii) or (iv). 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4(b)
Consider any nite sub-agenda X 6= f?;
g (of the -algebra agenda ) which
is nested or satises jXnf?;
gj  4. If X is nested, the claim follows from
Theorem 1(b), as non-neutrality on X implies non-linearity on X. Now assume
jXnf?;
gj  4. We reduce the claim to the companion papers Theorem 4(b).
By that result, there is a pooling function F 0 for agenda X which is independent,
consensus compatible, and not linear. By Lemma 4, F 0 is induced by a pooling
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function for agenda  which is independent onX, (globally) consensus-preserving,
and not linear on X. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5(b)
Consider a simple sub-agenda X of -algebra , where X is nite and not f?;
g.
We construct a pooling function which, on X, is independent (in fact, neutral),
conditional-consensus-preserving, and non-linear. We may assume without loss of
generality that (X) = , because the Claimin the proof of Theorem 1(b) holds
analogously here as well.
As an ingredient of the construction, we use an arbitrary pooling function
(P1; :::; Pn) 7! P linP1;:::;Pn which, at least on X, is linear and conditional-consensus-
preserving. The function could be simply given by (P1; :::; Pn) 7! P1, which is
even globally linear and conditional-consensus-preserving. Let Dlin be its pooling
criterion for all events in X. To anticipate, the pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7!
PP1;:::;Pn to be constructed will have the pooling criterion D : [0; 1]
n ! [0; 1] for
each event in X, where
D(t1; :::; tn) :=
8<:
0 if Dlin(t1; :::; tn) < 1=2;
1/2 if Dlin(t1; :::; tn) = 1=2;
1 if Dlin(t1; :::; tn) > 1=2.
(6)
Consider any P1; :::; Pn 2 P. We must dene PP1;:::;Pn. We use the following
notation (which suppresses the parameters P1; :::; Pn):
p(A) : = P linP1;:::;Pn(A) for all A 2 ;
X1=2 : = fA 2 X : p(A)  1=2g;
X>1=2 : = fA 2 X : p(A) > 1=2g;
X=1=2 : = fA 2 X : p(A) = 1=2g.
Notice that for all A 2 X we have A 2 X>1=2 ) Ac 62 X>1=2 and A 2 X=1=2 ,
Ac 2 X=1=2. We now prove two claims (which use Xs simplicity).
Claim 1. X=1=2 can be partitioned into two (possibly empty) sets X1=1=2 and
X2=1=2 such that (i) each X
j
=1=2 satises p(A\B) > 0 for all A;B 2 Xj=1=2 and (ii)
each Xj=1=2 [X>1=2 is consistent (whence Xj=1=2 contains exactly one member of
each pair A;Ac 2 X=1=2).
To show this, note rst that X=1=2 has a subset Y such that p(A \ B) > 0
for all A;B 2 Y (e.g., Y = ?). Among all such subsets Y  X=1=2, let X1=1=2
a maximal one, and let X2=1=2 := X=1=2nX1=1=2. By denition, X1=1=2 and X2=1=2
form a partition of X=1=2. We show that (i) and (ii) hold.
(i): Property (i) holds for X1=1=2 by denition, and for X
2
=1=2 by the following
argument. Let A;B 2 X2=1=2 and for a contradiction let p(A \ B) = 0. By the
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maximality property of X1=1=2, there are A
0; B0 2 X1=1=2 such that p(A \ A0) = 0
and p(B \ B0) = 0. Thus, p(A \ C) = p(B \ C) = 0 where C := A0 \ B0.
Since the intersection of any two of the sets A;B;C has zero p-probability, we
must have p(A) + p(B) + p(C) = p(A [ B [ C)  1, a contradiction because
p(A) = p(B) = 1=2 and p(C) = p(A0 \B0) > 0 (the latter because X1=1=2 satises
(i)).
(ii): For a contradiction, let some Xj=1=2 [X>1=2 be inconsistent. Then (since
X and hence Xj=1=2 [ X>1=2 are nite) there is a minimal inconsistent subset
Y  Xj=1=2 [X>1=2. Since X is simple, we have jY j  2, say Y = fA;Bg. Since
A \ B = ?, we have p(A) + p(B) = p(A [ B)  1. And since p(A); p(B)  1=2,
it follows that p(A) = p(B) = 1=2, i.e., A;B 2 Xj=1=2. Hence, by (i), we have
p(A \B) > 0, a contradiction as A \B = ?.
Claim 2. \C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C and \C2X2=1=2[X>1=2C are atoms of the -algebra
, i.e., (-)minimal elements of nf?g (they are the same atoms if and only if
X=1=2 = ?, i.e., if and only if X1=1=2 = X2=1=2 = ?).
To show this, rst write X as fC0j ; C1j : j = 1; :::; Jg, where J = jXj =2 and
each pair C0j ; C
1
j consists of an event and its complement. We may write  as
 = f[(k1;:::;kJ )2K(Ck11 \    \ CkJJ ) : K  f0; 1gJg: (7)
Recall that  is the -algebra generated by X. The inclusion in (7) is obvious,
and the inclusion holds because the right side of (7) includes X (since any
Ckj 2 X can be written as the union of all Ck11 \ ::: \ CkJJ for which kj = k) and
is a -algebra (check closedness under taking unions and complements).
From (7) and the pairwise disjointness of the intersections of the form Ck11 \
::: \ CkJJ , it is clear that every consistent such intersection is an atom of . Now
\C2Xj
=1=2
[X>1=2C is (for j 2 f0; 1g) precisely such a consistent intersection. Indeed,
\C2Xj
=1=2
[X>1=2C is consistent by Claim 1, and contains a member of each pair
A;Ac in X. The latter holds by Claim 1 if p(A) = p(Ac) (= 1=2), and otherwise
because there is a B 2 fA;Acg with p(B) > 1=2, i.e., with B 2 X>1=2  Xj=1=2 [
X>1=2. This proves Claim 2.
We can now dene PP1;:::;Pn. By Claim 1, we may pick !
1 2 \C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C
and !2 2 \C2X2
=1=2
[X>1=2C, where we assume that !
1 = !2 if X=1=2 = ?, i.e., if
\C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C = \C2X2=1=2[X>1=2C = \C2X>1=2C. Let !1 and !2 be, respec-
tively, the Dirac measures on  at !1 and !2, given for all A 2  by !j(A) = 1
if !j 2 A and !j(A) = 0 if !j =2 A. Let
PP1;:::;Pn :=
1
2
!1 +
1
2
!2,
where !1 and !2 depend on P1; :::; Pn via X1=1=2; X
2
=1=2; X>1=2. So PP1;:::;Pn(A) is
1 or 1/2 or 0 depending on whether A (2 ) contains both, exactly one, or none
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of !1 and !2; and PP1;:::;Pn = ! if !
1 = !2 = !, i.e., if X=1=2 = ?. We nally
show that the so-dened pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn has all desired
properties.
Independence on X. We in fact show something stronger, i.e., neutrality on X
with pooling criterionD given in (6). Let P1; :::; Pn 2 P, A 2 X and (t1; :::; tn) :=
(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)). We prove that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = D(t1; :::; tn) by considering three
cases and using the above notation p; X>1=2; X1=1=2; X
2
=1=2; !
1; !2.
Case 1. p(A) = Dlin(t1; :::; tn) < 1=2. Here D(t1; :::; tn) = 0. So we must
prove that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 0, i.e., that !
1; !2 62 A. Assume for a contradiction that
!1 2 A (the proof is analogous if we instead assume !2 2 A). Then A includes
\C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C, as this set contains !
1 and is by Claim 2 an atom of . So
Ac \ [\C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C] = ?. Hence the set fAcg [X1=1=2 [X>1=2 is inconsistent,
so has a minimal inconsistent subset Y . As X is simple, jY j  2. Now ? 62 Y as
Ac 6= ? (by p(Ac) = 1  p(A) > 1=2) and as all B 2 X1=1=2[X>1=2 are non-empty
(by p(B)  1=2). So jY j = 2. Further, Y is not a subset of X1=1=2 [ X>1=2, as
this set is consistent by Claim 1. So Y = fAc; Bg for some B 2 X1=1=2 [ X>1=2.
As Ac \ B = ? and as p(Ac) = 1   p(A) > 1=2 and p(B)  1=2, we have
p(Ac [B) = p(Ac) + p(B) > 1=2 + 1=2 = 1, a contradiction.
Case 2. p(A) = Dlin(t1; :::; tn) > 1=2. Then D(t1; :::; tn) = 1. Hence we must
prove that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1, i.e., that PP1;:::;Pn(A
c) = 0. The latter follows from
case 1 as applied to Ac, since p(Ac) = 1  p(A) < 1=2.
Case 3. p(A) = Dlin(t1; :::; tn) = 1=2. Then D(t1; :::; tn) = 1=2. So we must
prove that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1=2, i.e., that A contains exactly one of !
1 and !2. As
p(A) = 1=2, exactly one of X1=1=2 and X
2
=1=2 contains A and the other one contains
Ac, by Claim 1. Say A 2 X1=1=2 and Ac 2 X2=1=2 (the proof is analogous if instead
A 2 X2=1=2 and Ac 2 X1=1=2). So A  \C2X1=1=2[X>1=2C, whence !1 2 A. Further,
!2 =2 A because A is disjoint from Ac, hence from its subset \C2X2
=1=2
[X>1=2C
which contains !2.
Non-linearity on X. Pooling cannot be linear, since otherwise for any xed
A 2 Xnf
;?g (6= ?) the collective probabilities PP1;:::;Pn(A) could take any given
values t 2 [0; 1] (for instance by letting P1(A) =    = Pn(A) = t), a contradiction,
since by denition PP1;:::;Pn(A) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g.
Conditional-consensus-preservation on X. Let A;B 2 X and P1; :::; Pn 2 P
such that Pi(A [ B) = 1 for all i. We show that PP1;:::;Pn(A [ B) = 1, which
establishes conditional-consensus-preservation on X by Proposition 1(a). For all
i, Pi(A) +Pi(B)  Pi(A[B) = 1, and hence Pi(A)  1 Pi(B) = Pi(Bc). So, as
Dlin : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] takes a linear form with non-negative coe¢ cients and hence
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is weakly increasing in every component,
Dlin(P1(A); :::; Pn(A))  Dlin(P1(Bc); :::; Pn(Bc))
= D(1) Dlin(P1(B); :::; Pn(B))
= 1 Dlin(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)).
So, with p as dened earlier, p(A)  1 p(B), i.e., p(A)+p(B)  1. We distinguish
between three cases.
Case 1. p(A) > 1=2. Then, by the above proof of independence on X,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1. So PP1;:::;Pn(A [B) = 1, as desired.
Case 2. p(B) > 1=2. Then, again by the above proof of independence on X,
PP1;:::;Pn(B) = 1. Hence, PP1;:::;Pn(A [B) = 1, as desired.
Case 3. p(A); p(B)  1=2. Then, as p(A) + p(B)  1, we have p(A) =
p(B) = 1=2. LetX>1=2; X1=1=2; X
2
=1=2; !
1; !2 be as dened above. Note that A;B 2
X1=1=2 [X2=1=2. It cannot be that A and B are both in X1=1=2: otherwise Ac and
Bc are both in X2=1=2 by Claim 1, whence p(A
c \ Bc) > 0 (again by Claim 1), a
contradiction since
p(Ac \Bc) = p((A [B)c) = 1  p(A [B) = 1  1 = 0
(where p(A[B) = 1 because p(A[B) = P linP1;:::;Pn(A[B) and Pi(A[B) = 1 for all
i). Analogously, it cannot be that A and B are both in X2=1=2. So one of A and B
is in X1=1=2 and the other one in X
2
=1=2; say A 2 X1=1=2 and B 2 X2=1=2 (the proof
is analogous otherwise). So A  \C2X1
=1=2
[X>1=2C and B  \C2X2=1=2[X>1=2C, and
hence !1 2 A and !2 2 B. Thus !1; !2 2 A [B, whence PP1;:::;Pn(A [B) = 1. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the -algebra agenda , and let jj > 23 = 8, i.e., jj  24 = 16.
Then  includes a partition of 
 into four non-empty events. Let X be the sub-
agenda consisting of any union of two of these four events. In the proof of the
companion papers Proposition 2 we construct a pooling function for this agenda
X which is neutral, consensus-preserving, and non-linear.17 By Lemma 4, this
pooling function is induced by a pooling function for agenda  which, on X, is
neutral, consensus-preserving, and non-linear. 
17That proof took the four mentioned events to be singleton, but nothing depends on this.
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